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█ Abstract In direct opposition to the dominant nativist perspective tracing back to Descartes, William James 
suggested that the sense of self is constructed through a never-ending process of reflexivity. In more recent 
years, empirical data from various psychological domains (notably developmental, clinical and social psycholo-
gy) have further strengthened this constructivist perspective. Notably, Gergely and Watson’s social biofeed-
back model has been proposed as a central mechanism in the development of emotional introspection, which 
itself constitutes a crucial step in the process leading to a mature sense of self. In accordance with the social bio-
feedback model, it has been suggested that reiterated failures in biofeedback mechanisms predispose an indi-
vidual to mental suffering. While borderline personality disorder and antisocial behavior have received the 
most attention, here I make a preliminary attempt to examine the impact of dysfunctional biofeedback on the 
pathogenesis of narcissism, suggesting that some central features of pathological narcissism may result from 
serious and reiterated disruptions in social biofeedback. This preliminary exploration aims to deepen our un-
derstanding of the origins of psychological suffering. In this sense, my effort could contribute to the construc-
tion of a causal model going beyond the purely categorical, atheoretical analysis of mental diseases typical of the 
diagnostic and statistical manuals.  
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█ Riassunto Il farsi e il disfarsi del sé. Biofeedback sociale, meccanismi causali e narcisismo patologico – La 
prospettiva costruttivista sullo sviluppo del sé, efficacemente difesa da William James in opposizione 
all’innatismo di stampo cartesiano, è oggi ulteriormente avvalorata da numerosi dati empirici provenienti 
da diversi ambiti della psicologia (in particolare, psicologia dello sviluppo, clinica e sociale). Il modello del 
biofeedback sociale di Gergely e Watson è stato proposto quale meccanismo centrale nello sviluppo 
dell’introspezione emotiva. In accordo a tale modello, ripetuti gravi fallimenti del biofeedback predispon-
gono al disturbo mentale, segnatamente al disturbo borderline di personalità e al comportamento antiso-
ciale. In questo saggio mi occuperò di disturbo narcisistico di personalità, suggerendo che anche alcuni dei 
sintomi principali di questa patologia potrebbero derivare da disfunzioni gravi e reiterate del biofeedback. 
Nonostante la sua natura preliminare, la mia indagine si inscrive nell’alveo di quelle ricerche che mirano 
costruzione di un modello causale che vada oltre l’analisi puramente categoriale e ateoretica tipica dei 
manuali statistico-diagnostici.  
PAROLE CHIAVE: Self; Identità personale; Social Biofeedback Model; Disturbo narcisistico di personalità 
 
  
RICERCHE 
 
(α)Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”, via 
Galileo Ferraris, 116 - 13100 Vercelli (I) 
E-mail: cristina.meini@uniupo.it () 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale - © Cristina Meini 2020 
  Meini 
 
114 
█  1 Becoming a self 
 
AS WILLIAM JAMES PARADIGMATICALLY 
SUGGESTED, the sense of self is not given at 
birth, but is constructed through a never-
ending process of reflexivity.1 In this view, 
self-consciousness is defined in terms of iden-
tity, i.e., a process of self-description that uni-
fies and synthesizes experiences. In the illu-
minating words of Dan McAdams, the self is 
«really more like a verb; it might be called 
“selfing” or “I-ing”, the fundamental process 
of making a self out of experience».2 Selfing 
activity produces the three different Jame-
sian selves-as-object: the material, social, and 
psychological Me-representations.  
With his analysis, James paved the way 
for a number of theories that stressed the ev-
erlasting nature of personality development. 
According to many scholars, subjective inte-
gration is progressively attained through in-
terpersonal processes. Pivotal in this sense is 
research at the intersection of infant studies 
and clinical psychology, as paradigmatically 
expressed in Bowlby’s attachment theory.3 
Especially relevant for our analysis are his In-
ternal Working Models (IWMs), memory 
structures that register and store significant 
interpersonal events.  
Not surprisingly, during infancy, most 
IWMs represent situations involving a child 
and her caregivers, thus contributing to the 
construction of an enduring autobiographical 
self that is constitutively a self-in-relation-
with-others, endowed with memories of past 
relationships and unique psychological atti-
tudes towards new relationships. Fully en-
dorsing Bowlby’s constructive perspective on 
development, Giovanni Liotti4 made refer-
ence to IWMs when considering mental dis-
eases such as dissociative personality disor-
ders. In optimal situations, secure attach-
ment gives rise to coherent and unitary 
IWMs of self and others, thus promoting the 
development of a highly integrative selfing 
process in McAdams’ sense. At the other ex-
treme of the spectrum, a markedly disor-
ganized style of attachment leads to multiple 
incoherent or incompatible IWMs. In turn, 
dissociated relational memories generated by 
reiterated dysfunctional interactions progres-
sively menace self integrity and predispose an 
individual to psychological suffering, as de-
finitively attested by decades of clinical ob-
servations. In an analogous constructivist 
spirit, Peter Fonagy endorses a Bowlbian per-
spective, while putting the emphasis on the 
role of mentalization in self development. 
Since his earliest writings, Fonagy5 has 
stressed the need to go beyond the original 
interpretation of attachment as a merely mo-
tivational system devoted to providing pro-
tection in situations of vulnerability. Instead, 
he has suggested that, in human beings, at-
tachment has the function of promoting 
mindreading. More precisely, Fonagy was in-
itially persuaded that both mindreading di-
rected at other minds and introspective min-
dreading depended essentially on attach-
ment, but progressively modified this view in 
accordance with empirical data that unam-
biguously proved the precocity of hetero-
directed mindreading. By contrast, introspec-
tive mindreading develops much more slowly 
and is crucially modulated by the quality of 
interpersonal relationships. In this updated, 
more refined theoretical account, Fonagy 
suggests that the crucial process in the devel-
opment of self-introspection is social biofeed-
back,6 i.e. a constructive process that leads 
children to recognize their own emotional 
states.  
I next describe the main distinctive fea-
tures of social biofeedback.7 
 
█  2 The social biofeedback model 
 
The social biofeedback process typically 
takes place in the context of protoconversa-
tions, i.e., dyadic, affective relationships in-
volving a child and her caregiver. During pro-
toconversations, both partners are actively 
engaged in multimodal, affectively-charged 
interactions, reciprocally exchanging infor-
mation through improvisation, imperfect imi-
tation, eye contact, and sensitivity to those 
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dynamic features of behavior unfolding in 
time that Stern called «forms of vitality».8 
For example, the child might start a protocon-
versational session by vigorously smiling at 
her father, who in turn looks at her and touch-
es her legs with a coherent vigorous gesture, 
while at the same time saying something with 
a high, well articulated, and assertive tone of 
voice. Despite their different modalities, these 
interactions share a coherent (vigorous and 
assertive) form of vitality having a high degree 
of contingency. 
According to the social biofeedback model, 
protoconversations constitute the context in 
which the infant triggers the constructive pro-
cess leading to psychological introspection.9 
This model firmly contrasts with the strong 
intersubjectivist perspective, which regards 
young infants as already capable of perceiving 
their mental states.10 According to Meltzoff, 
for example, when infants engage in sponta-
neous early imitation of adult behavior, they 
generate the corresponding feeling states in 
themselves; these states are then introspective-
ly accessed and attributed to the other by in-
ference.11 This is also in line with Goldman’s 
inner-sense view, which holds that introspec-
tion ontogenetically precedes and grounds 
mentalization of others’ minds.12  
Nonetheless, a more cautious interpreta-
tion of the data usually invoked to argue that 
infants possess an innate, primitive, proprio-
ceptive form of self-consciousness merely 
suggests an innate capacity to form first-
order representations.13 Although young in-
fants can represent the world, nothing proves 
that they are also able to draw distinctions 
between inner and outer, subject and object, 
or self and other.14 More probably, they can 
only experience a core affect,15 i.e., a rough 
experience of hedonic pleasure and displeas-
ure with some degree of arousal.16 
In line with this view, the social biofeed-
back model makes the hypothesis that at the 
beginning of life infants have a primary bias 
to attend to and explore external reality. 
Their early representations are mainly based 
on exteroceptive stimulation; they lack a 
complementary capacity to cognize their in-
ternal worlds. Such competence is construct-
ed through a complex process sustained by 
children’s innate sensibility to the contingen-
cy of actions.17 This process progressively 
leads to the first form of psychological self-
consciousness: affective self-consciousness.  
A good starting point to detail social bio-
feedback is the marked nature of interac-
tions. Indeed, focusing more closely on pro-
toconversations, one easily notes that adults 
tend to respond to infants’ affective expres-
sions with «marked» mirroring, i.e., with a 
response that only partially mirrors children’s 
behavior, while introducing a fictional cue. In 
other words, caregivers have the tendency to 
display reactions that are highly congruent, 
but also schematic, often exaggerated, and 
partially incoherent. For example, a parent 
tends to react to a sad, crying infant with an 
initial manifestation of sadness (as expected 
by perfect mirroring) that rapidly turns into a 
light smile. Instead, he tends to react to a joy-
ful child with an expression that is a mix of 
joy (i.e., the genuinely mirrored expression), 
tenderness, and possibly surprise. Important-
ly, empirical data attest that the high-but-not 
perfect degree of contingency18 between pa-
rental mirroring and ongoing affective expe-
rience is registered by the child.  
The expressive exaggeration of parental 
mirroring, coupled with a soothing tone and 
lacking the typical behavioral consequences 
of genuine expressions, fulfils its first func-
tion by mitigating expression that could have 
had an excessively arousing effect on a young 
baby, still incapable of affective self-
regulation. In particular, negative conse-
quences for a sad infant are avoided or miti-
gated by a “non-fully sad response”, thus 
avoiding a vicious circle the infant would be 
unable to escape from. Vice versa, the joyful 
child would risk becoming overexcited by a 
parent perfectly mirroring her own excita-
tion. More importantly for us, marked affec-
tive expressions have a crucial pedagogical 
function.19 By simultaneously emphasizing 
central aspects of the somatic emotional 
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manifestations and signaling that the dis-
played emotion is “not for real”, the adult en-
courages the child to “decouple” the emo-
tional expression from its apparent referent. 
Once decoupled, however, the affect-
mirroring display still needs to be interpreted 
as referring to “someone’s emotion”. To 
achieve her goal, the child notices (1) a drop in 
the contingency between parental mirroring 
behavior and her ongoing core affective expe-
riences, and (2) that a highly salient stimulus 
such as adult gaze is ostensively and continu-
ously directed at her. At the end of the moni-
toring process, the child becomes able to «ref-
erentially anchor the marked mirroring stimu-
lus as expressing [her] own self-state».20 In 
such a process, she progressively refines her 
sensitivity to her ongoing feeling, which is 
recognized in its multiple, distinct compo-
nents. The name of the overall process, social 
biofeedback, recalls the terminology used in 
the physiological domain to denote what hap-
pens when someone is sensitized to some 
physiological internal event (e.g., arterial pres-
sure) through being exposed to an external 
device monitoring his or her internal situa-
tion. In the social domain, the same kind of 
process results in emotional introspection.  
To review the main steps of social bio-
feedback: (1) the infant notices the caregiv-
er’s affect-mirroring but, at the same time, 
confusedly experiences a core affect;21 (2) she 
becomes sensitive to the degree of contin-
gency between actions and responses; and (3) 
she perceives the drop in contingency, to-
gether with the slightly fictional character of 
parental responses, which triggers a process 
that culminates in secondary affective repre-
sentations.22 These representations pertain to 
core affect and provide the basis for the in-
fant’s emerging self. The selfing process has 
reached a crucial stage.  
 
█  3 Breakdowns of social biofeedback 
 
What happens when something goes 
wrong? Coherently with the social biofeed-
back model, serious and repeated break-
downs of early emotional interactions can 
derail the development of affective intro-
spection, as children are prevented from es-
tablishing the necessary mapping between 
the representations of emotional states in 
others and their own innate states.23  
To consider a paradigmatic case, imagine 
a young child interacting with an adult who 
suffers from a serious psychological disease. 
The adult, who is inattentive to the child’s 
affective needs because of his own suffering, 
not only tends to insufficiently mark his 
emotional expressions when responding to 
protoconversational stimuli, but is also easily 
“infected” and overwhelmed by the child’s 
states. For example, when his sad child starts 
crying, a depressed parent either does not 
mirror at all, or fails to mark his inattentive 
mirroring with some fictional element modu-
lating the spontaneous expression of his neg-
ative experience, thus depriving the child of a 
crucial pedagogical cue promoting the devel-
opment of introspection. The child’s sense of 
agency is also menaced, making it difficult 
for her to feel actively involved in the affec-
tive-communicative context.  
It is not surprising that repeated failures 
of social biofeedback have been associated 
with the etiopathogenesis of personality dis-
orders, notably borderline personality disor-
der.24 In this condition, the poorly developed 
sense of self is “markedly and persistently un-
stable”,25 incoherent, and discontinuous, en-
gendering not only a characteristic feeling of 
emptiness, but also a sense of diffuse entity 
that Otto Kernberg for one took as the essen-
tial element in the borderline symptomatic 
framework. Switching self-concepts might 
then represent a strategy to preserve a fragile 
structure, as a potentially adaptive response 
to self-discrepant information.26  
Among the most significant pathological 
consequences of the borderline patient’s frag-
ile self, Fonagy and collaborators point to the 
regression, under conditions of emotional 
stress, to prementalistic styles of introspec-
tion and – consequently – to manipulative, 
controlling behavior. Specifically, in stressing 
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conditions the borderline patient experiences 
a sense of psychic equivalence in which the 
states of others are assimilated into her own 
psychic reality, such that no alternative per-
spective on a situation is made available and 
every thought appears to be concrete. This 
situation engenders a sense of omnipotence, 
i.e., the conviction of knowing whatever is in 
the others’ minds. Pretense is the complemen-
tary prementalistic strategy, in which mental 
states are dissociated from reality and facts are 
described as internal experiences unmodulat-
ed by reality. According to the third premen-
talistic strategy – the teleological stance – in-
ternal states are felt only when consequences 
are publically manifested. Consequently, the 
patient continuously experiences the need to 
monitor and manipulate reality, as this ap-
pears to be the only way to obtain evidence of 
people’s benevolence or antagonism.27 
In this paper I aim to go beyond Fonagy’s 
hypothesis concerning the etiopathogenesis 
of borderline personality disorders, in order 
to focus on a different personality disease 
whose origins could be related to repeated 
failures of socio-biofeedback: narcissism 
(NPD). This is not a straightforward enter-
prise, because of the variety, and even appar-
ently reciprocal tensions, among narcissistic 
symptoms. In order to consider whether 
NPD might be related to reiterated break-
downs of social biofeedback, I devote the 
next section to an overview of the most re-
current pathologic manifestations. I shall ex-
amine them from the main clinical perspec-
tives that have historically offered an explana-
tion of this pathological condition. A deeper 
analysis, with reference to contemporary ap-
proaches would, though relevant, go beyond 
the limits of my present investigation. 
 
█  4 Narcissism: Some historical and clinical 
notes 
 
Clinical accounts of the narcissistic per-
sonality distinguish three behavioral types. 
Akhtar28 describes two opposite phenotypes 
– although he admits possible episodic fluc-
tuations between the two poles. While more 
“prototypical” overt narcissists tend to be ex-
troverted, arrogant, assertive and aggressive, 
covert narcissists are introverted, shy, fragile 
and hypersensitive; nonetheless, despite their 
insecurity, even covert narcissists produce 
grandiose, unrealistic self-fantasies. Overt 
narcissists impose their ego on others, while 
covert narcissists have the propensity to 
withdraw from social contexts in which oth-
ers could scrutinize their self-centered preoc-
cupations. There is also a form of malignant 
narcissism,29 a narcissistic structure frequent-
ly associated with antisocial behavior, psy-
chopathy, hostility, and violence.  
These three rather conflicting personality 
structures, described primarily in psychoana-
lytic accounts, are only partly reflected in the 
DSM-V, which stresses the sense of grandios-
ity: «The essential feature of narcissistic per-
sonality disorder is a pervasive pattern of 
grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of 
empathy that begins by early adulthood and 
is present in a variety of contexts».30 None-
theless, the section Associated features sup-
porting diagnosis reveals that «Sustained feel-
ings of shame or humiliation and the at-
tendant self-criticism may be associated with 
social withdrawal, depressed mood, and per-
sistent depressive disorder (dysthymia) or 
major depressive disorder».31 
In sum, some very important differences 
notwithstanding,32 the DSM-V and psycho-
analytic-oriented accounts agree that narcis-
sism is characterized primarily by a hyper-
trophic sense of self, with significant fluctua-
tions of self-esteem and a proclivity to expe-
rience self-threats.33 These experiences of 
self-fragility lie at the origin of the character-
istic violent fluctuations between a sense of 
grandiosity and nonentity, strong feelings of 
pride and profound despair.  
A historical reconstruction of the clinical 
accounts of narcissism cannot but start with 
Sigmund Freud, whose writings dedicated to 
narcissism paved a way marked by some in-
consistencies and even contradictions, but 
were extremely fruitful for subsequent theo-
  Meini 
 
118 
retical research and clinical practice (alt-
hough it should be remarked that, in its orig-
inal sense, the Freudian construct referred to 
a wider condition, including paranoia, hypo-
chondria, paraphrenia, manic-depressive 
psychosis, animism, and melancholy). 
Freud34 notoriously distinguished between 
primary and secondary narcissism. Primary 
narcissism is typical of a precocious step in 
healthy development, in which the Ego is in-
vested with libido. Normally, primary narcis-
sism is followed by a stage in which the libid-
inal investment is readdressed towards ex-
ternal objects. When this process in blocked, 
the psychic energy is defensively redirected 
to the Ego, giving rise to secondary, patho-
logical narcissism. Indeed, Freud35 stressed 
the self-preserving function of narcissism, 
thus pointing to the defensive nature of the 
hypertrophic Ego.36 In this theoretical 
framework, self-defending attitudes account 
for the aggressive, unempathic nature of the 
narcissistic type.  
The existence of a continuum between 
physiology and pathology, as well as the de-
fensive nature of narcissism, are two qualify-
ing points that have been further scrutinized 
in the following decades, sometimes from 
theoretical perspectives that cannot be re-
duced to Freudian orthodoxy. 
A celebrated example of heterodoxy is 
Donald Winnicott. From a relational point of 
view with a specific focus on real (as opposed 
to idealized) relationships, Winnicott37 was 
skeptical about the existence of primary nar-
cissism. From birth, children’s attention is 
directed to the external world, above all to 
the interpersonal world that in early experi-
ence is mostly populated by caregivers mir-
roring their behavior. While attuned mirror-
ing allows the child to see himself in the eyes 
of others, thus promoting self-development, 
reiterated failures in mirroring result in a 
false self; narcissism represents a defensive 
strategy against the feeling of vulnerability 
related to this false self. Winnicott’s idea that 
the quality of mirroring significantly impacts 
self-construction can easily be found in 
Kernberg and Kohut. 
Among the legatees of Freud’s seminal re-
flection on narcissism, Otto Kernberg38 is 
probably the one who most vigorously high-
lighted its defensive and compensatory func-
tion. He made reference to a narcissistic per-
sonality structure, conceived as an articula-
tion of the borderline personality disorder. 
Despite his deep interest (having a clear 
Kleinian origin) in intrapsychic processes, 
Kernberg agrees that pathological narcissism 
is grounded in early relationships with cold, 
usually hostile but sometimes intrusive care-
givers who have excessive expectations from 
the child.39 They claim they are investing in 
their “brilliant child”,40 but their parental 
style is emotionally dismissing, fundamental-
ly avoidant but – at times – intrusive. What 
the child perceives through the eyes of her 
cold and extremely demanding parents are 
images that fail to match what she directly 
perceives about herself. While a realistic im-
age, mixing positive and negative features, 
would promote self-development, unrealistic 
grandiose images promote no personal 
growth. The fracture between what the in-
fant internally perceives and the mirrored 
self-images coming from the cold caregivers 
eventually results in a pathological but pro-
tective grandiose self, in which memories of 
negative experiences are expunged. Given 
such dynamics, unintegrated aggressiveness 
turns out to be a central feature in Kern-
berg’s41 analysis of pathological narcissism, a 
primary destructive force that in some ex-
treme cases gives rise to malignant narcissism. 
A rather different perspective on narcis-
sism has been defended by Heinz Kohut,42 
the author who introduced the term narcissis-
tic personality disorder. He made reference to 
the Freudian hypothesis of a beneficial pri-
mary narcissism, an early stage in which the 
still-unstructured self and external objects are 
not perceived as separate. Nonetheless, in ac-
cordance with the relational turn, he did not 
consider primary narcissism to be a fully self-
standing, auto-referential developmental 
stage. Equally importantly, Kohut considered 
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pathological narcissism to be merely a stop of 
the developmental process. Differing from 
Kernberg, who invoked a developmental dis-
tortion in the etiopathogenesis of narcissism, 
Kohut placed the origins of the disease in the 
failure of a healthy internalization of ideal-
ized parental images.43 Under optimal condi-
tions, empathic parental mirroring progres-
sively scaffolds both an idealization of paren-
tal figures and a positive, grandiose sense of 
self, which assumes and internalizes parental 
standards, thereby becoming the child’s own 
standards. Parental positive support, togeth-
er with their mirroring of the child’s strength 
and limitations – but also momentary frus-
trating moments when the child is left alone 
by inattentive parents – structure and modu-
late a positive but realistic and integrated 
sense of self. In healthy conditions, this pro-
cess results in benign adult narcissism, which 
is an important precondition for developing 
fundamental human qualities such as a sense 
of humor, wisdom, aesthetic interests, but 
also for accepting unavoidable limitations 
and the caducity of the human condition. 
When parental style is systematically cold 
and dismissing, the self-differentiation pro-
cess is threatened. Adults’ indifference and 
rejection prevent the child from idealizing 
their image and thus block the whole selfing 
process. The way to a pathological condition 
has been paved. 
Importantly for us, in Kohut’s perspective 
narcissistic adults rigidly engage in interper-
sonal relationships in “archaic” ways. As in 
infantile narcissism, they use others to scaf-
fold and modulate their still immature self, 
providing that unconditioned admiration 
which is a necessary condition to feel alive. 
When such admiration is lacking, or not 
boundless, the reaction can be violent. In-
deed, unempathic attitudes, as well as rage 
and aggressive or destructive propensities, 
are secondary reactions to narcissistic inju-
ries, somehow necessary to overcome feelings 
of anxiety or shame, and ultimately to estab-
lish an extreme but provisional self-
integration. In other words, violence is just a 
way of expressing anxiety. 
 
█  5 Back to social biofeedback 
 
Despite Kernberg’s initial view of the nar-
cissistic personality structure as a possible 
characterization of borderline personality 
disorder, nowadays the two pathologies are 
taken to be distinct and independent.44 In 
everyday clinical practice, the most salient 
difference is probably the contraposition be-
tween instability and disintegration of the 
self. Narcissistic disaggregation of the self is 
structural, and not circumscribed to strong 
emotional experiences. Borderline patients 
need others to regulate their fragmented self 
and envisage emotionally stressing situations, 
while the narcissistic self cannot exist at all 
without grandiose self-projection. Premen-
talistic, archaic modalities are in place in-
stead of full-fledged introspection, while het-
ero-directed mindreading can even be over-
practiced, especially for manipulative goals. 
Indeed, in recent years, both developmental 
psychology and clinical practice have sug-
gested that, in contrast to the long and com-
plex processes that are necessary to develop 
introspection, hetero-directed mindreading 
is largely sustained by innate psycho-
biological mechanisms.45 The narcissistic 
person can thus be seen as an extreme exam-
ple of that dissociation, with refined hetero-
directed mindreading strongly overtaking 
poorly-developed introspective capacities. 
A scientifically informed analysis of nar-
cissism cannot disregard the evidence for ge-
netic predisposition – up to 79%, according 
to Torgersen’s extensive twin study.46 None-
theless, genetic data do not rule out the influ-
ence of dysfunctional relationships, which 
are rather peculiar to the narcissistic pathol-
ogy and attested by decades of clinical obser-
vation. Specifically, while borderline disorder 
tends to be associated with various insecure 
styles of attachment,47 even the brief over-
view proposed above confirms the prepon-
derance of avoidant caregiving styles in nar-
cissism. When the mix of overvaluation and 
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coldness so frequently described in the clini-
cal literature is protracted over time and con-
stitutes the baseline for interpersonal rela-
tionships, it impacts the quality of marked-
ness, which tends to be inattentive and, so to 
speak, untuned. While BPD has been associ-
ated with a preponderance of unmarked re-
sponses, the typical relational style of narcis-
sistic people involves caregivers who are, so 
to speak, “coldly attentive”. In these condi-
tions, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
adult’s responses are marked, but rather un-
tuned, issuing either from emotional misun-
derstanding or even from a failure to detect 
child’s emotions. Consequently, self-other 
differentiation through social biofeedback is 
strongly impaired, paving the way for a situa-
tion of compromised introspective capacities 
and – ultimately – for an extremely fragile 
self-identity that is strongly dependent on 
others. Pathological consequences can 
emerge even precociously, since NPD is even 
diagnosed in infancy.48  
This empirical hypothesis on the peculiar 
nature of dysfunctional marking, and its role 
in the pathogenesis of narcissism, could easi-
ly be tested in controlled observational set-
tings. Such an analysis, together with a paral-
lel rigorous analysis of the nature of marked-
ness in BPN, would first and foremost shed 
further light on the computational process - 
marked socio-biofeedback – that plausibly 
plays a causal role in the pathogenesis of per-
sonality disorders (not only BPD but also, as 
already suggested by Fonagy, NPD). Equally 
important, it could help to definitively dis-
tinguish between two pathologies that, by 
virtue of exhibiting similar signs and symp-
toms, have always been associated, even 
when the hypothesis of their different nature 
has been prevalent. 
 
█  6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have suggested that social 
biofeedback represents an important compo-
nent in the long and complex process of iden-
tity construction. Specifically, through proto-
conversations characterized by marked mir-
roring, infants acquire information that trig-
gers a biofeedback process progressively lead-
ing to emotional introspection. Conversely, 
iterated serious failures of biofeedback pre-
dispose individuals to personality disorders. 
While the relationship between failures of bio-
feedback and borderline personality disorder 
has been investigated, the possible impact of 
untuned biofeedback on pathological narcis-
sism remains to be explored.  
I have suggested that NPD represents a 
case study for the social biofeedback perspec-
tive on self-identity development that is at 
least as interesting as BPD. In both cases, the 
selfing process seems to be blocked by seri-
ous interpersonal dysfunctions that trigger 
pre-mentalistic strategies such as those indi-
cated by Fonagy and collaborators. Nonethe-
less, when we focus on the relational contexts 
related to these two pathological conditions, 
differences rapidly emerge. The parental 
style typically involved in NPD is more uni-
vocally grounded in the avoidant continuum 
and, at the same time, is more pervasive, 
while early interpersonal exchanges of bor-
derline patients are less dysfunctional, both 
in time and in style.  
To the extent that a relationship between 
mental diseases and dysfunctional computa-
tional mechanisms is explicitly established, 
the hypothesis on the origins of narcissism 
preliminarily sketched in this paper is coher-
ent with the strong interpretation of the med-
ical model applied to psychiatry.49 In contrast 
to minimalist interpretations, which take 
mental disorders to be mere collections of 
signs and symptoms occurring together and 
unfolding in typical ways, strong interpreta-
tions make commitments about the underly-
ing causes of mental illness. Ultimately, com-
putational processes obviously take place at 
the neurological level, but the strong medical 
model does not privilege any specific level of 
explanation – not even the biological one. 
Rather, psychiatry is considered to be a mul-
ti-level science and an elucidation of the 
computational processes involved at any lev-
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el represents an important step towards a 
mature explanation of mental diseases. In 
particular, such analysis represents concrete 
progress with respect to the a-theoretical and 
symptomatologically-based diagnostic cate-
gories of DSMs. Although the latest edition 
of the diagnostic-statistical manual contains, 
in the definition of mental disorders, a refer-
ence to «a dysfunction in the psychological, 
biological, or developmental processes un-
derlying mental functioning»,50 the accent is 
still on signs and symptoms. Advances in bio-
logical and psychological knowledge will 
hopefully render psychiatry more aware of its 
potentialities, not only from the explanatory 
point of view, but also for increasingly accu-
rate clinical interventions. 
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